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IN THE SUPREME COllRT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OP UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent. 
-v- Case No. 19082 
IRRIAN ORTIZ, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Ibrian Ortiz, was charged by information 
with Aggravated Robbery, a felony in the first degree, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-6-302 (1953 as amended). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty of Aggravated Robbery, a 
first degree felony, in a jury trial held February 14 and 15, 
1983, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, 
presiding. on March 4, 1983, appellant was sentenced to five 
years to life at the Utah State Prison and a consecutive 
sentence of at least one year, but not more than five for 
using a firearm to commit the offense. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this court affirming 
trip judgment and sentence of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of September 20, 1982, Richard 
flul lock was the only attendant on duty at the Quality Oil gas 
•station and convenience store at 3900 south qoo East in salt 
Lake City, Utah (T. 9-10), Mr. Bullock was in the back room 
at approximately 9:00 p.m. when two men entered the building. 
Mr. Rul lock returned to the cash register and the two men 
approached him. One pointed a gun at Mr. Bullock and ordered 
him to lie down on the floor, which he did (T. 11, 13). The 
two men emptied the cash register and fled from the station. 
Mr. Bullock then got up and called the police. 
This entire incident was witnessed by Becky Edwards. 
Ms. Edwards was just leaving the gas station with her young 
daughter as the two men entered. Because the attendant was in 
the back roan and the two men looked suspicious, Ms. Edwards 
paid particular attention to the two (T. 47-49). She returned 
to her car located near the station's gas pumps and from there 
watched the entire robbery (T. 47-49). 
Both Mr. Bullock and Ms. Edwards accurately and 
consistently identified appellant as one of the two robbers of 
the Quality Oil station. Immediately following the robbery 
Mr. Bullock gave salt Lake City police officers a description 
of the robbers' appearance and clothing (T. 20-21). on May 
22, two days after the robbery, Detective James Grant of the 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office showed Mr. Bullock an array 
of approximately 20 photos (T. 26, 61) which Bullock 
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positively identified appellant as one of the robbers (T. 
107--108). Later that day Detective Grant showed the same 
photo array to Ms. Edwards; she too identified appellant as 
.one of the robbers (T. 109--109). Ms. Edwards acknowledged 
some question in her mind as to her identification of 
appellant because she had seen him with a hat on and found it 
difficult to picture him with hair (T. 53--54). She did 
recognize his face (T. 54), however, and by covering up the 
hair on all the photographs, Ms. Edwards was able to identify 
appellant from the photo array (T. 63--65). Both Mr. Bullock 
anrl Ms. Edwards also positively identified appellant in the 
courtroom (T. 15, 52); both witnesses accurately identified 
co-defendant Leonardo Rayesl as the other robber (T. 14, 52, 
10 5) . 
Appellant denied being with co-defendant Rayes on 
the evening of the robbery (T. 138) and claimed that he had 
spent that entire evening with Pedro Revas and Santiago Crisbo 
(T. 137, 139). The three men were stopped near 1500 South 200 
East, Salt Lake City, by a policeman around 10:30 p.m. that 
evening (T. 118--119) in response to an earlier report of a 
suspicious-looking vehicle near the vicinity of the robbery. 
Appellant gave notice of, but was unable to locate, Crisbo to 
testify as an alibi witness. The trial court did not allow 
Revas to testify because of the severely inadequate notice 
Leonardo Rayes' conviction is currently pending appeal 
hefore this court. 
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qiven to the State the Thursday preceding the Monday trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SINCE NOTICP. OF ALIRI WITNESS PEDRO REVAS 
WAS STATUTORILY INSUFFICIENT, REVAS' 
TESTIMONY WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED RY THE 
TRIAL JUDGE. 
The defense of alibi is governed by Utah Code Ann. 
77-14-2 (1953 as amended): 
( 1) A defendant . • who intends to 
offer evidence of an alibi shall, not less 
than ten days before trial or at such 
other time as the court may allow, file 
and serve on the prosecuting attorney a 
notice, in writinq, of his intention to 
claim alibi. The notice shall contain 
specific information as to the place where 
the defendant claims to have been at the 
time of the alleged offense and, as 
particularly as is known to the defendant 
or his attorney, the names and addresses 
of the witnesses by whom he proposes to 
establish alibi. 
The prosecutor has a reciprocal obligation to give ten days' 
notice of alibi rebuttal witnesses. If a party fails to give 
pruper not ice within the statutory requirements, "the court 
may exclude evidence offered to establish or rebut alibi." 
(Subsection (3)). Subsection (4) of the statute states that 
"[t]he court may, for good cause shown, waive the requirements 
of this section." 
In the case at bar, the State first received notice 
rof arpellant's only alibi witness on Monday, February 7, 1983, 
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when defense counsel disclosed her intent to rely upon the 
testimony of Santiago Crisbo (T. 130). This notice came just 
one week prior to the February 14 trial date, but the court 
thnt the notice was adequate. Mr. Crisbo was 
subsequently released from the Salt Lake County Jail (his 
known residence) before either side had had an opportunity to 
interview him. Upon learning that Pedro Revas was also 
incarcerated at the jail, defense counsel telephoned the 
prosecutor to let him know of her intent to substitute Revas 
for Crisbo (T. 129). This phone notice came on Thursday 
afternoon at approximately 4:00 p.m., February 10, which 
preceded a long state holiday weekend (T. 130). The trial 
court held that under these circumstances, with the additional 
complication of obtaining an interpreter to be present for an 
interview, it would be an unreasonable burden on the State, 
based on the inadequate notice given, to allow Revas to 
testify ( T. 133) . 
Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its 
discretion in not allowing defense counsel to present alibi 
witness Pedro Revas, notwithstanding the fact that the State 
did not receive notice of this witness until the Thursday 
before the Monday trial - several days short of the ten day 
statutory minimum. Resides his failure to comply with the 
timing requirements of § 77-14-2, appellant also did not 
provide written notice of alibi witness Revas as is required 
by the statute. This Court need not blindly accept 
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oµpellant's mere allegation that the trial court abused its 
,J1scretion. In State v. Larson, Utah, 560 P.2d 335, 336 
11q77) this Court stated that the "burden lies on the party 
abuse of discretion to make such a showing 
showing of abuse has been made in the present case. 
No 
Decisions based upon the trial court's exercise of 
discretion enjoy a great degree of deference when subsequently 
challenged. "[A)s in all discretionary matters, due to his 
prerogatives and his advantaged position, the trial court is 
allowed considerable latitude in the exercise of that 
discretion, which the appellate court will not interfere with 
unless it plainly appears that there was abuse thereof." 
State v. Forsyth, Utah, 560 P.2d 337, 339 (1977). (Emphasis 
added). The trial judge's rulings are not to be disturbed 
absent a showing that the trial judge exceeded his authority 
or acted beyond reason. Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of 
Salt Lake County, Utah, 555 P.2d 281, 284 (1976). 
Although this Court has not specifically adopted 
such a definition, other courts have uniformly held that an 
abuse of discretion results only "when no reasonable person 
would take the position adopted by the trial court." 
v. Averbeck Realty, Inc., 92 Wash. 2d 576, 599 P.2d 1289, 1293 
(lq79). see also Lemons v. st. John's Hospital of Salina, 5 
kan. App. 2d 161, 613 P.2d 957, 960 (1980). In the present 
rase, while reasonable persons may differ as to whether the 
stnte received adequate notice of alibi witness Revas, 
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the rebuttal witnesses had already previously testified 
during the State's case-in-chief the defense had been given 
"1rnpl1ed prior knowledge" of the content of their testimonies. 
• S85 P. 2d at 448. No new evidence was offered by these 
rebuttal witnesses, but only a clarification of information 
which already had been presented at trial. The court 
crincluded that, based upon these facts, the trial court had 
not abused its discretion by allowing the witnesses to testify 
in rebuttal. The holding of Haddenham, however, should not be 
extended beyond its particular facts. In the case at bar the 
State did not have "implied prior knowledge" of Revas' 
testimony as that term was restricted to the fact situation in 
Haddenham. The State was given no opportunity to discover the 
content of Revas' testimony; any statements made by Revas at 
trial would have created unfair surprise. 
was properly excluded. 
Rev as' testimony 
state v. case, Utah, 547 P. 2d 221 ( 1976) also has 
significant factual distinctions from the case at bar. In 
Case the testimonies offered as rebuttal to the alibi defense 
included that of the victim, who had already testified as a 
prosecution witness, and that of a witness subpoenaed by the 
defense but not called to testify at trial. The Court 
reac; oned that the defendant wou 1 d not be prejudiced by the 
testimonies because the defense was in a position to know the 
content of the two witnesses' testimonies -- the victim's 
because she had already testified and was subject to defense 
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questioning, and the uncalled defense witness' because he had 
subpoenaed and undoubtedly had been interviewed by the 
1Pfense. Therefore, the trial court was justified in allowing 
.these witnesses to testify despite failure of the prosecution 
to give advance notice in compliance with the statute. 
Thus, this Court has established an exception to the 
general rule of ten days' notice of alibi or rebuttal 
witnesses. In order for a party to fall within this 
exception, opposing counsel must know of the content of the 
alibi or rebuttal witness' testimony, either through prior 
testimony actually offered at trial or through an opportunity 
to question the witness prior to trial. In the present case, 
the State was given no opportunity to discover the content of 
Revas' testimony. Although Revas was alleged to have been 
with appellant on the evening of the robbery, absolutely no 
earlier indication was given by appellant that Revas would be 
called as an alibi witness. 
Although not a Utah case, the recent decision of 
People v. Buono, N.Y. Sup., 469 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1983), is 
applicable to the present case. In Buono, the New York 
Supreme Court expressly rejected this Court's holding in State 
v. Case, 547 P.2d 221, and held that even thouqh the defendant 
had provided the name of the witness as a possible alibi, the 
prosecutor could not call him as a rebuttal witness without 
proper statutory notice. The Buono court reasoned that the 
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defense was entitled to know whom the prosecution would rely 
upon in rebuttal; the prosecutor's mere opportunity to know 
thP content of a possible witness' testimony is not enough to 
overcome the statutory notice requirement, • See also People v . 
Alexander, Mich., 267 N.W. 2d 466, 468-469 (1978). 
In the instant case, the State had neither 
opportunity to interview Revas, nor actual knowledge of the 
defense's intention to call Revas as an alibi witness until 
Just a few days before the trial. The not ice given was 
inadequate. Where proper notice has not been given, the trial 
court has discretion to allow or disallow testimony by the 
witness. Absent a showing of abuse of discretion the trial 
court's decision should not be reversed, Therefore, this 
Court should affirm Judge Frederick's exercise of discretion 
in not allowing Revas to testify. 
POINT II 
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT 
NOTICE OF AN ALIBI WITNESS DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL. 
Appellant claims that he was prejudiced by 
inadequate representation when defense counsel failed to file 
not ice of an alibi witness within the statutory deadline, thus 
preventing appellant from corroboratinq his alibi. 
Arpellant's claim is without merit. The governing legal 
standards applicable to a claim of ineffective assistance of 
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• 
counsel were recently summarized by this Court in Codianna v. 
Utah, 660 P. 2d 1101 ( 1983): 
This Court has previously held in a 
murder case involving appointed counsel 
that an accused "is entitled to the 
assistance of a competent member of the 
Bar, who shows a willingness to identify 
himself with the interest of the accused 
and present such defenses as are available 
under the law and consistent with the 
ethics of the profession. State v. 
McNicol, Utah, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (1976). 
Accord, State v. Gray, Utah, 601 P.2d 918 
(1979); Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 
449 P.2d 241 (1969). The McNicol test has 
a subjective element--"willingness to 
identify himself with the interests of the 
accused"--and an objective element--" 
competent member of the Bar." The 
objective element is measured both by 
general ability or experience and by 
performance in the defense of a particular 
case. Both elements (willingness to 
identify with the accused, and competence) 
are essential to adequate representation. 
The McNicol test, which we reaffirm, 
includes all of the requirements the Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
identified in its recent redefinition of 
the constitutional requirements of 
effective assistance of counsel. After 
rejecting the "sham and mockery" test that 
had previously been applied in the Tenth 
and other circuits, the court held: "The 
Sixth Amendment demands that defense 
counsel exercise the skill, judgment and 
diligence of a reasonably competent 
defense attorney." Dyer v. Crisp, 613 
r.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir. 1980) (en bane). 
Relying on Dyer v. Crisp, supra, and 
other authorities, our recent opinion in 
State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56, 58 
( 1982), identifies the following 
considerations necessary to determine 
whether a conviction should be reversed or 
set aside on the basis of ineffective 
assistance of counsel: (1) The burden of 
establishing inadequate representation is 
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.. 
on the defendant, "and proof of such must 
be demonstrable reality and not a 
speculative matter." State v. McNicol, 
554 P.2d at 204. (2) A lawyer's 
"legitimate exercise of judgment" in the 
choice of trial strategy or tactics that 
did not produce the anticipated result 
does not constitute ineffective assistance 
of counsel. State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d at 
205. ( 3) It must appear that any 
deficiency in the performance of counsel 
was prejudicial. State v. Forsyth, Utah, 
560 P.2d 337, 339 (1977); Jaramillo v. 
Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19, 22, 465 P.2d 343, 
34511970). In this context, prejudice 
means that without counsel's error there 
was a "reasonable likelihood that there 
would have been a different result 
State v. Gray, 601 P.2d at 920. 
Similarly, as we noted in State v. 
Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 58, "the failure of 
counsel to make motions or objections 
which would be futile if raised does not 
constitute ineffective assistance. 
660 P.2d at 1109. These standards parallel those set forth by 
the United States Supreme Court in its recent decision of 
Strickland v. Washington, U.S. , 35 CrL 3066 (decided May 
14, 19 84) . under the Sixth Amendment a defendant is entitled 
to "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel. However, a 
reviewing court's analysis of an ineffective assistance claim 
is two-tiered. As stated in Strickland: 
A convicted defendant's claim that 
counsel's assistance was so defective as 
to require reversal of a conviction or 
death sentence has two components. First, 
the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires 
showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning 
as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant 
by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient 
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performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors 
were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable. Unless a defendant 
makes both showings, it cannot be said 
that the convict ion or death sentence 
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary 
process that renders the result 
unreliable. 
35 CrL 3071. 
In the case at bar neither deficiency of counsel's 
performance nor prejudicial result has been shown by 
appellant. The trial transcript reveals that upon Judge 
Frederick's denial of Revas' testimony, defense counsel Ms. 
Nesset-Sale requested that the record "reflect that the delay 
and the noncompliance because of the delay . [left] Mr. 
Ortiz open for a valid claim of ineffectiveness of counsel" 
( T. 131). The trial judge, however, would not acknowledge any 
claim of incompetency and instead placed the blame for the 
lateness of information reqarding Revas on appellant. The 
trial transcript, in relevant part, reads as follows: 
[MS. NESSET-SALE:] I do believe that 
because of this Court's ruling, Mr. Ortiz' 
right to have his defense put on has been 
jeopardized, and certainly there is an 
i nef fe ct i ve nes s-and- incompetence-of-
cou nsel argument that ought to be well 
taken by a review in court [of] this 
matter. 
THE COURT: The Court certainly 
appreciates your position, Ms. 
Nesset-Sale. However, the Court is not 
ready to acknowledge any claim of 
incompetency or ineffectiveness of 
counsel. I think on the contrary, you 
have conducted yourself in a very 
journeyman-like manner in the presentation 
of the defense in this case • 
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The record further reflects that Mr. 
Ortiz either was or should certainly have 
been aware of those persons upon whom he 
was going to rely for purposes of 
est ab 1 is h ing his alibi or ind iv id ua 1 s with 
whom he was personally acquainted in the 
vehicle the night of the stop testified to 
by Officer Robinson. Therefore, it 
certainly may wel 1 have been the case, and 
I don't choose at this time to inquire of 
you whether or not it was, but certainly 
the Court's view that it may well have 
been the case that if there was any blame 
to be placed for the lateness of providing 
information about the other individual, 
Mr. Revas, that you intended to rely upon 
at this time, that may well lie on Mr. 
Ortiz as opposed to his counsel. 
(T. 131-132). 
In the event that blame is placed on counsel, it is 
clear that defense counsel's failure to provide adequate 
notice of Revas as an alibi witness resulted from counsel's 
trial tactics, not incompetency. Defense counsel chose to 
call Santiago Crisbo as the only alibi witness, although she 
could have given notice of a second potential alibi witness at 
the same time, The record does not indicate the specific 
reasons for appellant's counsel's decision not to give earlier 
not ice of this second alibi witness. However, it should be 
presumed that counsel had valid, tactical reasons for that 
decision. As noted by the court in State v. Workman, Ariz. 
App., 600 P.2d 1133 (1979): 
courts distinguish between counsel 
failing to act because of ignorance of the 
facts or the law, and failing to act 
despite his knowledge of the facts or law. 
In the latter situation, counsel is 
-14-
presumed to have made an informed 
decision, even where the tactical 
advantage is not readily apparent to the 
appellate court. 
Especially when the question is 
whether or not to call a particular 
witness, courts are reluctant to 
second-guess the attorney. There are 
factors that do not readily appear on 
record that can lead an attorney to decide 
that a particular witness is undesirable 
or that his participation in the defense 
may harm the defendant more than his 
testimony, even if it provides an alibi, 
will aid him. 
600 P.2d at 1135. 
Defense counsel originally chose not to rely on 
Revas as an alibi witness, and this Court should not 
sec ond-g ues s the reasoning behind that decision. When her 
original witness, Crisbo, was unavailable to testify, only 
then did appellant's counsel give notice of Revas. By then, 
however, it was too late to comply with the statute. Defense 
counsel's trial tactics in relying on Crisbo did not produce 
the desired result, but this failure must not be interpreted 
as inef feet ive assistance of counsel. "A contrary conclusion 
would be merely speculative and the appellant presents no 
evidence to support one." State v. White, Utah, 671 P.2d 191, 
194 (1983). 
With respect to the defendant's burden to show 
preJudice if he or she is able to show that particular errors 
of counsel were unreasonable, the Supreme Court stated: 
-15-
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Even if a defendant shows that particular 
errors of counsel were unreasonable, 
therefore, the defendant must show that 
they actually had an adverse effect on the 
defense. 
It is not enough for the defendant to 
show that the errors had some conceivable 
effect on the outcome of the proceeding. 
Virtually every act or omission of 
counsel would meet that test, cf. United 
States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U-:-s:-858, 
866-867 (1982), and not every error that 
conceivably could have influenced the 
outcome undermines the reliability of the 
result of the proceeding. 
The defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been 
different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome. 
Strickland v. Washington, 35 CrL at 3073. 
Setting aside appellant's failure to show that 
counsel's error was unreasonable, appellant has made no 
showing of prejudice to the extent that the outcome of the 
trial would have been effected. The trial record contains 
consistent eyewitness identification of appellant as a 
participant in the robbery (T. 15, 52, 108-109). Appellant 
has not shown a reasonable probability the jury's decision 
would have been effected substantially by Revas' testimony had 
he been allowed to testify as an alibi witness. Rather, the 
evidence was sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction 
despite his alleged a 1 ibi. The requirements for a showing of 
inPffective assistance of counsel, as mandated by this Court 
-lli-
in Codianna and by the United States Supreme Court in 
Strickland, have not been satisfied. Appellant's conviction 
should he u phe 1 d . 
• 
CONCLUSION 
The trial judge, Judge Frederick, properly exercised 
t.is discretion in disallowing alibi testimony by Pedro Revas. 
The statutorily imposed notice as to Revas was severely 
deficient, and did not provide ample time for the prosecutor 
to prepare rebuttal testimony, Absent a showing of abuse of 
discretion, the trial court's decision should be upheld. 
The insufficiency of notice must not be attributed 
to inadequacy of counsel, but rather was the result of trial 
tactics which failed to produce the desired result. Defense 
counsel was not ignorant of Revas' testimony, but instead 
chose to rely upon another alibi witness. counsel's inability 
to locate Crisbo and the resulting insufficient notice as to 
Revas is in no way a reflection upon counsel's representation 
of appellant. Moreover, the evidence presented at trial 
established appellant's guilt and no showing was made that a 
different result was reasonably probable had Revas' alleged 
alibi testimony been permitted. Based upon the foregoing, the 
Judgment and sentence of the trial court should be affirmed. 
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